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1. Introduction 
Investment is a significant element of household behavior. Changing how to invest in a sense would 
change household behavior. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with shareholder power believe 
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that it has the intention of pushing and encouraging businesses in order to adopt more sustainable 
practices. Refers to (Kong et al. 2002), Shareholder Action Network (SAN) that is initiated by NGOs is 
seen as a tool to scaling stock ownership power for a good change (i.e. Good governance). The NGOs 
collaboration with socially responsible investment (SRI) groups addresses to encourage and inform 
institutional and individual shareholders to exercise their power for the sake of good governance and 
sustainability of the firm. Furthermore, there is a phenomenon of the active role of institutional and 
individual investors demanding more SRI group, since it is one of the fastest-growing investment sectors. 
 
Green and sustainable finance offer a promising future for global stock exchanges. It is seen from the 
significant growth of green finance products over the decades. In addition, green bond and green equity 
indices have better performance compare to non-green bonds or equity indices. Notwithstanding, 
sustainable investment initiatives are still in the early stages. It infers that this phenomenon would arise 
significant growth opportunities for exchanges and market stakeholders to strengthen their competitive 
position in sustainability matters (Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative 2016). 
 
Recognition of sustainable aspect of the corporation through indices has become a feature of the global 
capital market. Sustainable investment in Asia is growing increasingly 32.5% of the market capitalization 
from 2012 to 2014. Specifically, in South-East Asia, there are only two stock exchange indices from 
Indonesia and Malaysia and one combined ASEAN Index (CSR Asia, 2016). The development of 
sustainable investment in South East Asia countries relies on government policies initiatives and 
corporate practices. Each country has a different sustainability landscape and approaches regarding policy 
and regulation, voluntary expectations and government incentives. This study focuses on one of the three 
aspects of this landscape, which is voluntary expectations that come from NGOs to enhance the 
sustainability approach to firms and investors in Indonesia. 
 
Previous institutional studies ignore the internal condition of a country, which show has an important role 
in shaping reforms in ESG (environment, social responsibility, governance) aspects. The presences of 
ESG in the national context are a complex and dynamic process involving the interaction between 
different actors with their own interests (Ahmad and Mahmood 2015). These resolutions of sustainable 
investment are increasing the attention of institutional investors, small and large shareholders, and 
company executives. NGOs believe has a significant role in this novelty, using their status as advocates, 
advisors, and push for changing the policy (Guay, Doh, and Sinclair 2004). 
 
In the emerging market, foreign institutional investors would increase their invested capital in preference 
to profitable, growing and larger firms (Kansil and Singh 2017). Meanwhile, the influential institutional 
ownership of the firm’s indicators of sustainability depends on the economic condition. There is a demand 
for a study to measure the extent to which of institutional investors selection on socially responsible 
investments (Buchanan, Cao, and Chen 2018). There is a lack of study that explores the role and 
preference of specific institutional investment, especially NGOs in the emerging capital market. 
 
NGOs are known to have an intense concern to the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues 
in investment. For that reason, this study is aim to empirically test the NGO investment preferences in the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange based on the unique data set of free float shares ownership by NGOs in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The authors identify the impact of the firm size, firm liquidity level and 
recognition of sustainability as factors that imply the preferences of the foreign NGOs ownership in the 
Indonesia equity market. 
 
2.   Literature Review 
2.1 Institutional Ownership 
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Hester (1994) arises the phenomena regarding the evolving role of institution, instrument, and markets. 
Allen and Santomero (1997) argued that the cost-benefit of participation in the stock market became an 
important consideration in understanding the institution activities and particularly their focus on risk 
management. It supports the argument of different investment pattern of institutional investment 
regarding the point of view of risk management across nations (Prowse, 1990). 
 
Modern stakeholder’s theory underlined that it is not only about maximizing the wealth, but also 
unleashing the importance of power, urgency, and legitimacy of stakeholders. Managing that three 
elements closely related to the corporate environment and governance (Mitchell, Wood, and Agle 1997). 
Ryan and Schneider (2003) addressed re-concentration of ownership and control spawned by the 
institutional investing influence the management in the context of the modern firm. Moreover, the shift in 
foreign institutional investor standing and complexity of corporate landscape has been fundamentally 
transformed (Huang and Zhu 2015). 
 
Institutional investors seem to prefer to invest in a firm with specific characteristics. Foreign institutions 
with direct stock investment seem to have a tendency to invest in a firm with large size, high level of 
liquidity and global recognition (Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001). Firms with higher ownership by 
institutions with no underlying interests (independent) are seen to have higher in valuations, better 
financial performance, and efficient in capital allocation, which infers the institution's actively monitoring 
corporations (Ferreira and Matos 2008). In addition, macroeconomic factors such as currency return also 
influence the institutional investors’ money flow in the capital market (Froot and Ramadorai 2005). 
 
The typology of institutional investors which is identified by Ferreira and Matos (2008) characterize 
institutional investors with differences of “colors” in terms of their ability to actively monitor corporate 
policies and decisions. The first typology of institutional investors is based on the origin, Domestic and 
Foreign Institutional Ownership. The second comes from the institution type, Independent Institutional 
Ownership (e.g. mutual fund managers and investment advisers) and Grey Institutional Ownership (e.g. 
bank trusts, insurance companies, pension funds and endowments or Non-Government Organization). 
This study focuses on the preference of domestic and foreign NGOs (grey institutional) ownership. 
 
When the executives behave as rational agents to maximize shareholders wealth, the primary concern will 
be to create additional values for their shareholder's interests. Theoretically, executives of the company 
have to respond to NGOs shareholder’s pressure to balance the profits and environmental aspects (people 
and planet) with consistency (Spar and Mure 2003). The preferences of shareholder ownership rely on 
specific variables that affect the perceived value which leads to the decision to invest, hold or sell the 
shares (Petersen and Vredenburg 2009). Based on that assumption, institutional investors tend to prefer 
socially aligned organizations to invest in their capital, this study explored to what extent to which the 
preference of socially linked institution (such as NGO) investment preferences in a stock market. 
 
2.2 Sustainable Investment 
Good governance that leading data transparency in this empowered technological era has become easier 
and cheaper. For that reason, the investment in assets featured with balancing profit and non-profit aspects 
is driven with promising movement and growing premium during decades. ESG investing allows 
investors to express their own values and to ensure that their savings and investments reflect their 
preferences, without compromising on returns (Forbes, 2018). 
 
The term ESG investment par to sustainable investing, socially responsible investing (SRI), mission-
related investing or negative investment screening practice. ESG investment is engaged to the mixed 
stakeholders’ perspective. From a firm perspective, ESG related policy requires complex strategic 
planning due to its direct relations to decisions with a long-term impact, including production technology, 
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the use natural resources, and the social dimension, which refers to fulfill both interests of the business 
environment (van Duuren, Plantinga, and Scholtens 2015). 
 
From individuals’ point of view, ESG investing offers the opportunity for sustainable growth and 
shareholders activism (i.e. voting rights) for good governance and environment. And for policymakers, it 
should be a welcome market-led development that ensures that the common good does not get lost in 
short-term profit making at any cost. In general, ESG information is seen as modern tools to manage risk. 
For that reason, there is a concern from the global investor community to developing various methods for 
integrating ESG information optimally into investment practices (van Duuren et al. 2015). Related to this 
study, institutional investors increase the awareness of ESG investment in order to identify companies that 
are well positioned for the future and to avoid those which are likely to underperform. Many conventional 
fund managers (i.e. pension fund manager) have already adopted features of responsible investing in the 
investment process. 
 
Harvard Business School global surveys (Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 2017) arises the insight for the 
direction of ESG investment in the future. There is client demand for sustainable investment or as part of 
their product development process. Investors believe that ESG metrics provide useful information more 
on risks management. The uniqueness of sustainable investment data leads to ESG investors exhibiting 
different ESG investment styles. Furthermore, this study expects to identify the ESG investment styles of 
NGO’s which related to certain preferences of stock selection. 
 
The successful business today emerged from an organization that able to bring an innovative solution that 
tied to sustainability issues. From a company point of view, there is an effort to become a sustainable 
business that called “use a global presence” which closely related to recognition of company in a global 
context. Multinational corporations (MNCs) gained an advantage to experiences sustainability practices 
overseas in order to make certain alignment to the business. Meanwhile, the governments in developing 
countries have become concerned about the sustainability aspects and encouraged companies to introduce 
a sustainable standard (i.e. GRI) and the next level of sustainable products & processes (Nidumolu, 
Prahalad and Rangaswami 2009). Furthermore, these initiatives lead to strategic Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) projects that address to solve the problem of the natural environment and society. 
 
Developing countries push voluntary basis sustainability reporting for a corporation (especially public 
company) which addresses the importance of market education and engagement approach related to 
sustainable investment. Sustainability reporting closely related to companies’ activities that adopt 
environmental and ethical management standards and practices. These initiatives lead a corporation to 
gain credibility for the stakeholders and set the sustainability standard for the industry. Nevertheless, as 
with sustainability reporting in developed countries, there is a lack of a system delivering market-relevant 
information related to risk management that is incorporated into decision-making for investors (United 
Nations Environment Program 2016). 
 
According to Corporate Knights (2016) report series from 2012-2016, stock exchanges sustainability 
recognition was ranked based on the disclosure, growth, and timeliness. The data used in the analysis was 
obtained from Bloomberg’s ESG database based on indicators of energy use, carbon emissions, water use, 
waste generation, rate of employee injury, rate of employee turnover and personnel costs. As shown in 
figure 1 below, there is a notable improvement of sustainability disclosure ranking in South East Asia 
Region, specifically from Stock Exchange of Thailand and Bursa Malaysia. Meanwhile, Indonesia Stock 
Exchange is still lagged behind. 
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Source: Corporate Knights Sustainability Disclosure Ranking 
Figure 1: Ranking the South East Asia’s Stock Exchanges Sustainability Disclosure (2012-2016) 
 
The key aspect highlighted in global sustainability closely tied to the demands and concerns of foreign 
institutional investors to demonstrate best practice in corporate governance. Sustainability indices are also 
a popular way to recognize sustainability initiative among firms in stock exchanges. Many countries are 
developing indices that integrate social and environmental issues. Meanwhile, the indices tend to operate 
as a public recognition of good business practice without concern of the basis for a financial mechanism. 
However, the development of global sustainability indices has driven the development of locally relevant 
sustainability criteria and the capacity to assess investment practices (United Nations Environment 
Program, 2016). 
 
As of June 2009, in an effort to develop sustainable initiatives in Indonesia, KEHATI foundation and 
Indonesia Stock Exchange have launched SRI KEHATI Index. This index follows the standard and 
regulation based on Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI) principles. Interestingly, a selection 
mechanism for the companies to be included in SRI KEHATI Index conduct every six months by both 
negative exclusion business practice and fundamental condition including several key financial aspects 
(KEHATI Foundation 2009). As the result, companies with the highest score declared to eligible into SRI 
KEHATI Index. This study accounted recognition of sustainable firm in Indonesia by firm appearances on 
SRI KEHATI Index. 
 
In sum, the uniqueness of NGOs as institutional investors in the equity market indicates potential 
differences to the preferences of stock selection. However, there is a lack previous study that explains the 
preferences of NGOs in sustainable investment practices. Due to the high exposure of sustainable 
investment in emerging market and lack of study explore the role of NGO as an institutional investor in 
equity market; we propose two hypotheses that would test in the null form: 
 
H1 Recognition of sustainability does not affect NGO shares ownership 
H2 Recognition of sustainability does not affect NGO growth of invested capital 
 
3.   Research Methods 
The sample utilized in the study is gathered from The Indonesia Central Custodian Depository (KSEI) and 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the period of September 2015 – August 2018. The raw data includes 
monthly shares ownership for domestic and foreign institutions and individual investors, including NGOs 
in all listed firms, stock price, number of shares outstanding, market capitalization and transaction volume 
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of tradable shares. In addition, the recognition of firm sustainability gathered from the firm inclusion on 
SRI KEHATI index. 
 
As this study is looking for the growth of invested capital, the short period of holding shares and missing 
month of ownership data are excluded. In addition, the small portion of NGOs invested capital as low as 
IDR50,000,000 (around $3,000) is excluded from the sample which is an indication of low engagement of 
shareholders to concern on firm policy and decision making. In addition, firms that present incomplete 
information on the required variables will be excluded from the sample. 
 
Based on our recent data of free-float shares ownership in the Indonesian equity market during 2015 – 
2018, respectively ownership of NGO’s growth more than 80% for domestic and 120% for foreign NGOs. 
Unique dataset from Indonesia evidence addressing insight of the importance to analyze the preference of 
NGO ownership in the stock market. 
 
Institutional investors prefer to invest capital into a firm with specific characteristics. The measurement of 
NGOs preference in this study is shown by the amount of share ownership and the growth of invested 
capital in a specific period. Meanwhile, the predecessor direct stock investment for NGOs investment 
modified from Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) model which are assessing the size, liquidity, and 
recognition of sustainability firm. Previous study Haladu and Salim (2017) found that the aspect of social 
recognition to sustainability has better to explain the phenomena in sustainability situation compared to 
environmental reporting. For that reason, recognition of sustainability of firm chosen instead to GRI 
(Global Reporting Initiative) performance indicators in this study to represent sustainable investment 
variable. 
 
Furthermore, two models in this study test the impact of market capitalization, liquidity and recognition of 
sustainability on the subsequent of NGO shares ownership. The analysis of stock ownership model likely 
performs with ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression approach (Abrahamson and De Ridder, 2015) with 
robustness test in window dressing and trade Discreteness effects (Sias et al. 2006). The regression model 
is described as follows: 
 
𝑂𝑤𝑛(𝑛𝑔𝑜 𝑖, 𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 {𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑐𝑎𝑝(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖, 𝑡) + 𝑏2𝑙𝑖𝑞(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖, 𝑡)} + 𝑏3𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖, 𝑡)          (1)  
                    
∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝(𝑛𝑔𝑜 𝑖, 𝑡) = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑐𝑎𝑝(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖, 𝑡) + 𝑏2𝑙𝑖𝑞(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖, 𝑡) + 𝑏3𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖, 𝑡)          (2) 
 
Own(NGO i, t)— NGO shares ownership in company (i), month (t). 
 
∆Investcap(NGO i,t)—the growth of NGO invested capital in company (i), month (t). 
Cap(firm i,t)—market capitalization of company (i) in month (t). 
Liq(firm i,t) Sust(firm i,t)—transaction volume of company (i) in month (t). 
Sust(firm i,t)—a dummy variable for firm recognition of sustainability from the firm (i) appearances on 
SRI KEHATI Index in month (t). 
 
4.   Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
There are gathered 10.899 possible observations from the monthly data of NGOs ownership in Indonesia 
from 2015-2018. Interestingly, 70% of observations come from domestic NGOs due to diversified shares 
ownership and tendency to invest a small amount of capital into small or the mid-capitalization firms. 
Table I reports the descriptive statistics during December 2015 – August 2018 which describes the 
difference of preferences between foreign and domestic NGOs ownership in term of amount of invested 
capital, numbers of firm invested, percentage of big capitalization firms invested, percentage of LQ 45 
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indexed firms invest the and percentage of SRI KEHATI index firms invested. This study focuses to 
analyze the foreign NGO’s stock ownership preferences in Indonesia which follow the approach of the 
previous study that selects foreign institution as research object due to the establishment of specific 
investment selection in developing countries equity market (Rhee and Wang 2009). 
 
The full panel data consist of 1764 observations with 49 stocks that have 36 months consecutive shares 
ownership of foreign NGO’s from September 30, 2015, to August 31, 2018. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Period Invested capital 
(in IDR) 
Growth Firms 
Invested  
Big 
cap 
firms 
LQ45 
Index 
Invested  
SRI 
KEHATI 
Index  
Invested 
F
o
re
ig
n
 N
G
O
s 
Dec-15 2,333,641,704,442 - 87 74% 69% 60% 
Dec-16 4,435,060,718,132 90.05% 79 76% 64% 52% 
Dec-17 5,166,226,909,581 16.49% 104 72% 80% 72% 
Aug-18 6,724,329,800,745 30.16% 89 74% 67% 60% 
       
D
o
m
es
ti
c 
N
G
O
s Dec-15 3,721,350,196,807 - 204 44% 89% 80% 
Dec-16 4,845,169,471,570 30.20% 207 47% 91% 80% 
Dec-17 6,507,918,549,785 34.32% 214 49% 91% 96% 
Aug-18 6,475,985,208,392 -0.49% 221 54% 96% 100% 
 
4.2 Findings 
The final panel data is tested for whether this assumption is valid for the random effects estimator is based 
on the Hausman test (Brooks, 2014). The viability of using fixed effect or random effect can be decided 
using Hausman test having the null hypothesis as, Ho: Random effects are consistent and efficient. This 
result is shown in table 2 below (Prob.) Cross-section random value < 0,05 for the first and second model, 
which infer the null hypothesis is rejected by the result. For that reason, the first and second model which 
simulated from 1764 data sets has a fixed firm effect. Fixed effect models are appropriate to consider a 
specific set of firms with limited to the behavior of these firms (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
Table 2: Hausman Test: Testing for Fixed or Random Affect 
 
Dependent Variable: Shares  Ownership (Model 1) 
Test cross-section random effects 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 77.947709 3 0.0000 
Dependent Variable: Invested Capital Growth (Model 2) 
Test cross-section random effects 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
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Cross-section random 20.837510 3 0.0001 
Table 3 reports the coefficients of the regression with a recognition of sustainability as a dummy variable. 
The coefﬁcient of the dummy variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the convention level for 
panel A, which can be interpreted as the positive effect of the firm inclusion on the sustainability index to 
shares ownership preference of foreign NGOs. 
 
Compared to the previous model of Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), the adjusted R square is obviously 
higher and the F-test for the overall model is signiﬁcant at 1 percent and 5 percent. The result from fixed-
effect ordinary least squares analysis of the first model shows the preferences of foreign NGOs on stock 
ownership in Indonesia equity market significantly influence by the level of liquidity, size, and 
recognition of firm sustainability. 
 
For that reason, this evidence contributes to the investment preferences for typology institutional 
investors’ theory (Ferreira and Matos, 2008), which specifically to the NGOs that is classified as grey 
investors group. This group was defined as investors with more loyal to corporate management and 
without reacting to management actions that are not in line with the interests of shareholders. In the other 
words, this type of institution is characterized as ‘‘pressure-sensitive’’ or ‘passive’ institutional investors 
(Almazan et al., 2005; Brickley et al., 1988).  
 
Table. 4 reports the coefﬁcients of the regression of the growth of invested capital as the dependent 
variable. The result literally shows the preferences of NGOs add or reduce the invested capital in the 
equity market significantly influence by market capitalization of the firm. In addition, the preferences of 
NGOs Invested Capital Growth for firms with large market capitalization (more than Rp50 trillion or 
around $3 billion) is also significantly influenced by the recognition of sustainability. Besides, liquidity 
level significantly influences NGOs Invested Capital Growth in small and medium firm sizes. For that 
reason, there are possible monthly trading activities occurred by foreign NGOs in medium and small size 
stocks. 
 
In theory of trusting the stock market, the lack of trust explains why investors do not participate in the 
stock ownership in the absence of any friction. There is a difference in trust across investors and countries 
to invest in the stock market (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008). For that reason, findings from panel B 
confirm that foreign NGO’s investors have differences in trusts when conducting direct investment in the 
Indonesia stock market. 
 
The results show that foreign NGOs preferences of investment growth only in the stocks with proper 
liquidity and with relatively big market capitalization. In addition, it can be inferred that the role of NGOs 
in Indonesia Stock Market is still limited to opportunism or speculator (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) rather 
than activism to initiate changes for the firm governance and likelihood of stock market. In the other 
words, the role of shareholder power that using money becomes a tool for a good change (Kong et al., 
2002) is not yet shown in Indonesia stock market. 
 
NGOs is advisedly to work with socially responsible investment (SRI) groups to encourage and inform 
shareholders to exercise their power (Kong et al., 2002). NGOs need to exercise their incremental role in 
order to support sustainable stock exchange initiatives. To conclude, NGOs should be taking on a more 
active role by maximizing the role of ownership by promoting more SRI initiatives, influence the 
sustainability policy of corporation and address stock exchanges concern regarding sustainability issues. 
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Table 3: Results of panel least regression for Panel A (fixed effect) 
 
PANEL A: NGO’s Stock Ownership 
Variables Full Panel Exclude 
Window 
Dressing 
Period 
Large Middle Small 
Constant -7.329871*** -8.089349*** -
60.41533*** 
13.35838*** 27.37329*** 
(2.402235) (2.606778) (1.017208) (2.460681) (8.522928) 
Liquidity -0.069801** -0.062581* -
0.052068*** 
-
0.377027*** 
0.081796 
(0.029725) (0.032307) (0.012967) (0.067252) (0.072865) 
Size 0.756456*** 0.785081*** 2.341771*** 0.384469*** -0.430652 
(0.077301) (0.083085) (0.027532) (0.057397) (0.291403) 
Recognition of 
Sustainability 
2.049662*** 1.301656*** 0.047885*** - - 
(0.285149) (0.309938) (0.002287) - - 
Adjusted R-
Square 
0.815243 0.834039 0.255476 0.108312 0.006093 
F-Statistic 153.5342*** 131.2695*** 13.31226*** 5.123201*** 0.999718 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The value in the bracket (value) is a 
standard error. 
 
Table 4: Results of panel least regression for Panel B (fixed effect) 
 
PANEL B: NGO’s Invested Capital Growth 
Variables Full Panel Exclude 
Window 
Dressing 
Period 
Large Middle Small 
C -1.97E+10*** -2.31E+10*** -
1.15E+11*** 
-2.32E+09 42685728 
(7.00E+09) (7.99E+09) (6.34E+09) (3.13E+09) (1.25E+08) 
Liquidity -3.515399 -5.261625 3.043153 -
6.297290*** 
-
0.335611*** 
(4.855289) (5.919134) (3.294986) (1.706263) (0.071650) 
Size 0.000323*** 0.000385*** 0.000294*** 0.000258*** -2.50E-05 
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(5.54E-05) (6.27E-05) (1.50E-05) (4.88E-05) (2.47E-05) 
Recognition 
of 
Sustainability 
-2.70E+09 -1.91E+09 8.65E+09*** - - 
1.71E+10 (1.89E+10) 3.63E+08 - - 
Adjusted R-
Square 
0.013679 0.030205 0.008667 0.041552 0.015767 
F-Statistic 1.479425** 1.807348*** 1.313699*** 2.471622*** 0.081282* 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The value in the bracket (value) is a 
standard error. 
 
4.3 The Robustness Test 
This study follows Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) approach to confirm the robustness of the data. The 
approach from Sias et al., (2006) seems to be fit with this study due to the application of monthly data set 
and the fact that we do not know when exactly the change in ownership occurs. There are two approaches 
to justify the robustness of the data that applied in this research paper, (1) Potential Bias due to Window 
Dressing and (2) Trade Discreteness. 
 
To identify whether there any potential bias of window dressing effects, authors excluding the last quarter 
(October, November, and December) of the year firm i data for shares ownership, market capitalization, 
liquidity and SRI KEHATI Index Appearing (Dummy). As a result of the fixed effect estimation for the 
exact same model, respectively table 3 and table 4 in column two shows no significant difference from the 
full sample (1764 observations) and sample that exclude window dressing periods (1323 observations). In 
the other words, a window dressing bias is not affected to the stock ownership and the invested capital 
growth of NGOs in Indonesia stock market. 
 
The aggregate institutional ownership data are available on a monthly basis. The possible bias could be 
found due to undiscovered when exactly the change in ownership occurs. For a given security, it is 
possible that the entire change in ownership occurs the first day, the last day, or somewhere in between a 
month. 
 
Nonetheless, to ensure that our results are not sensitive to such potential patterns, we conducted the 
analysis for small, medium, and large stocks. Stocks are sorted into three equal-sized groups based on the 
average annual market capitalization of firm separately. Furthermore, it hypothesizes that institutions 
account for most of the invested capital in the large stocks, changes in institutional ownership are more 
likely to be spread out over the months (trade discreteness) in medium and small stocks. In addition, 
recognition of sustainability variable only exists on large stocks.  
 
Thus, the results are systematically biased by the discreteness in changes in NGO ownership, then the 
small stock analysis should differ substantially from the medium and large stock analysis. Meanwhile, the 
differences in firm size reveal little evidence that discreteness of ownership changes affects the results of 
this study. In sum, the estimates by firm size suggest that the relation between monthly changes in NGO 
ownership and investment preferences is align to the institutional ownership theory that argued 
institutions has tendency to hold a stock with specifically with bigger market capitalization in relative 
longer periods in order to control and arise activism (Appel, Gormley, and Keim, 2016; Bushee, 2001; 
Bushee, Goodman and Sunder, 2018; Gillan and Starks, 2000). In the other words, there is a rising 
possibility of NGOs as one of the agent to rise activism to foster sustainability practice for public firms 
and market. 
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In this paper, the authors highlight that there is a positive effect on the firm inclusion on sustainability 
index towards ownership preference of foreign NGOs. The result from fixed-effect ordinary least squares 
analysis shows the preferences of foreign NGOs stock ownership in Indonesia equity market significantly 
influence by the level of liquidity, size, and recognition of firm sustainability. However, NGOs growth of 
invested capital during the observation periods only prefers for a stock with specific bigger market 
capitalization. 
Due to the limitation of observations, this study only observes for respective 36 monthly periods from 
2015-2018. Notwithstanding, the result shows free of window dressing effect and trade discreteness on 
different firm sizes. The selection of Indonesia somewhat become questionable due to the relatively small 
amount of NGOs investment compare to other institutions. In addition, NGOs investment regulation in 
Indonesia limited to article 7 section 1, 2 and 3 of the Indonesian Law No. 16, 2001, which does not 
specifically address the foreign NGO ownership in the capital market. For that reason, authors suggest the 
Indonesian government body such as Financial Services Authority (OJK) to address this issue regarding 
the regulation update of NGO shares ownership in the stock market in order to foster the likelihood of 
Sustainable Stock Exchange in Indonesia. 
 
Additionally, there is lack of ESG related training offers in Indonesia (Sustainable Stock Exchanges, 
2018). For that reason, this study encourages academia and practitioner to involve in the ESG investment 
training in Indonesia. Besides, there are demanding community investment and the development of green 
investment products (Bonds, Indices and Derivatives) in emerging market in which NGOs is seen as a 
catalyst for the sustainable related initiatives (Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative, 2016). 
 
Ultimately, the emerge of positive screening rather than negative screening in sustainable investment 
(Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim, 2017), segregation of institutional investors related to sustainability issues 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008) and activism role of institutional ownership in developing stock market (Guay 
et al. 2004) become an incremental element to be identified in the further study. Those factors could be 
significant to the sustainable investment body of knowledge and practices. 
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